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Congress Needs to Repair the Court's
Damage to 1983
Ivan E. Bodensteiner*
Today it is not unusual for a § 1983 plaintiffto establish a violation
of the US. Constitution and resulting injuries, yet be denied damages
because of the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the 1871 statute.
This anomaly is the result of several defenses created by the Court,
including absolute and qualified immunity, the rejection of respondeat
superior liability for municipalities, and the expansion of sovereign
immunity, based, in part, on a misinterpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Several other rulings of the Court narrow the
circumstances under which private parties are subject to§ 1983 liability,
refuse to exempt§ 1983 actions from the usual preclusion rules, limit the
protection of federal statutes that plaintiffs attempt to enforce through
_§ 1983, and eliminate supervisory liability. These restrictions have
contributed to the erosion of§ 1983 and its effectiveness. In short, civil
rights are often illusory.
Because there is little hope that the Court will become more
friendly to civil rights plaintiffs in the near future, this Article proposes
that Congress adopt corrective amendments to § 1983, designed to
overrule several of the limiting decisions issued by the Court. The
corrective amendments proposed will bring the statute closer to the
broad congressional goals and purposes of Congress in adopting§ 1983.
They will also force courts to treat civil rights claims as though they are
at least as important as, for example, tort claims against state and local
government.
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INTRODUCTION

Section 1983 reflects the view that civil rights are important and
that those rights are enforceable through the courts. Originally passed in
1871, § 1983 currently reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except. that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's •judicial capacity, injunctive relief shalJ not be
granted unless a decl£1ratory d_ecree was violated or
declar(!tory relief was unavailable. For the purpose of this
section, any act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
1
District ofColumbia.
Although it was passed 140 years ago, § 1983 remains very active,

1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The portion in italics was added by an amendment in 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-170, and the portion underlined was added by an amendment in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317,
§ 309(c).
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2

providing a cause of action for many lawsuits each year. Despite its
heavy use, § 1983 has been amended only twice, first in 1979 to subject
the District of Columbia to actions brought under§ 1983, and second in
1996, to provide judges some protection from injunctive relief after the
3
decision in Pulliam v. Allen. The "guts" of this statute can be reduced
to a few words: ''Every person who, under color of [state law], ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
4
shall be liable to the party injured .... " Very simply, the language
seems to provide a cause of action for anyone who has been deprived of
rights protected by the Federal Constitution and laws, with full relief
available. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights'; rather, it
provides a cause of action to enforce federally-created rights found in the
Constitution and statutes. While conduct violating these federallycreated rights may also violate state law and trigger state law claims,
Congress identified the need for federal law to supplement any
5
protections available under state law.
Despite its seemingly broad language, § 1983 was relatively
inactive during its first fifty years, with only twenty-one reported cases
6
decided under the section between 1871 and 1920. This was due, at
least in part, to the Court's narrow interpretation of constitutional
provisions providing for individual rights. In. 1961, the Court clarified
that state officials who violated state law, while depriving an individual
of rights protected by the Federal Constitution, acted "under color of'
7
state law.
The Court in Monroe also limited the use. of § 1983 by
interpreting the term "person'~ to refer to natural persons only, to the
8
exclusion of municipalities. Nearly twenty years after Monroe, § 1983
was given a bit of a boost when, in Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court held
that "laws" as used in § 1983 embraces a claim that the defendants
9
violated the Social Security Act As the Warren Court ·e xpanded the

2

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, CIVIL CASES COMMENCED BY NATURE OF
SUIT AND DISTRICT DURlNG THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2009 34, available

at www.ca7.uscourls.gov/rpt/2009_report.pdf (2009).
3
Pulliam v., Allen, 466 U.S. 522 ( 1984) (holding that a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity
is not immune from prospective injunctive relief in an action brought pursuant to§ 1983).
4
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2006).
5
Monroe. v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 ( 1961) (noting the evidence before Congress that showed the
unwillingness of many states to enforce their laws, the Court said the "federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy"). Even where states have enforceable laws and their courts arc
not hostile, § 19.83 is often preferred because a prevailing plaintiff, since 1976, is usually entitled to
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
6
Comment, The Civil Rights Act.~ Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J.
361,363 (1951).
7
Monroe; 365 U.S. at 238-39.
8
/d. at 191. This portion of the. opinion in Monroe was overruled seventeen years later in Monell v.
Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 ( 1978).
9
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. l, 6 (1980) (relying on both the "plain language" of§ 1983 and
earlier cases implicitly recognizing that § 1983 encompasses violations of federal statutes as well as

32

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

[Vol. 16:1

•

10

constitutional protection of individual rights between 1953 and 1969,
§ 1983 was utilized more frequently. Possibly because of the increased
use of§ 1983 to enforce these broader constitutional protections, in 1974
the Court provided executive officials with qualified in1munity from
11
liability for damages under § 1983.
In the same year, in Edelman v.
Jordan, the Court made it clear that § 1983 does not abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity protecting states from liability for
12
damages in federal actions. The Court's assault on § 1983 continues to
the present.
Part II of this Article addresses, in greater detail, the Court's
decisions significantly restricting the scope of § 1983 and the relief it
provides. Part III explores parallel limitations resulting from the Court's
interpretation of key constitutional and statutory provisions from 1972 to
the present. Part IV discusses possible congressional amendments to
§ 1983 that would more effectively protect the rights of individuals, both
constitutional and statutory.

II.

DECISIONS OF THE COURT INTERPRETING§ 1983 NARROWLY

Following is a list of the Court's holdings that have significantly
limited the effectiveness of § 1983 in serving as the vehicle for private
litigation designed to enforce federal constitutional and statutory rights:
(a) providing (i) absolute immunity from liability for state
and local governmental officials performing legislative
13
functions; and (ii) absolute immunity from liability for
damages for state and local governmental officials
performing judicial and quasi-judicial functions, including
14
the prosecutorial function;

(b) providing qualified immunity from liability for damages
to state and local governmental officials performing other
15
functions·

'

(c) excluding respondeat superior liability under § 1983 for
municipalities whose officials acting under color of law

the Constitution).
10
While the Warren Court is most frequently criticized for its expansion of the rights of the accused
in criminal cases, it decided a number of civil cases that expanded constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 ( 1961 ); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954).
11
Schcucrv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,247-48 (1974).
12
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-77 (1974).
13
See infra Part II.A.I.
14 /d.
15

See infra Part II.A.2.
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violate the constitutional or statutory rights of individuals,
i.e., the municipality is liable only if the challenged action
16
was taken pursuant to municipal policy;
(d) extending to states and state agencies Eleventh
Amendment protection from a judgment for damages that
17
would be satisfied from the state treasury;
(e) limiting or abandoning supervisory liability;

18

(f) imposing a ''plausibility" pleading requirement that
subjects more claims to dismissal for failure to state a
19
claim·

'

(g) making it more difficult to establish that action is taken
under "color" of state or local law, specifically where a
private party is authorized by law to take the challenged
action or granted a license by government knowing it will
exercise and use the-license in a manner that would not be
20
allowed if the government engaged in the action;
(h) establishing constitutional "guidelines" designed to limit
21
the amount of an award of punitive damages;

(i) limiting the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes to
circumstances where Congress, in clear and unambiguous
22
terms, creates rights enforceable under § 1983; and

G) subjecting
23

§ 1983 actions to the statutory "full faith and
provision and thereby opening the possibility

credit"
that § 1983 plaintiffs could be bound by; for example, the
24
constitutional rulings of state courts in criminal cases.

These holdings have effectively made constitutional rights ''second25
class rights" when compared to rights created by the common law.
Each of these holdings will be examined below.

16

See infra Part II.B. I .
17
See infra Part ILB.2.
18
See infra Part ll.C.
19 Jd.
20
See infra Part II.D.
21
See infra Part II.E.
22
See infra Part II.F.
23
28 u.s.c. § 1738 (2006).
24
See infra Part II.G.
25
As discussed in Part Ill, infra, the Court's limiting interpretation of§ 1983 is only part of the story
because the Court has been narrowing the scope of the constitutional provisions that plaintiffs
frequently seck to enforce through § 1983, including the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.
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Immunity of Individual Government Officials

State and local government officials can be sued for damages in
26
their individual capacity under § 1983. When such officials are sued in
27
Thus, such
their individual capacity, their personal assets are at risk.
government officials can be held personally liable in damages for actions
28
When state and local government
taken in their official capacity.
officials are sued in their official capacity for damages, the claim is
deemed to be against the governmental entity, not the individual, for the
29
purposes of § 1983. The following two subsections address two types
of immunity from damages when state and local government officials are
sued in their individual capacity, absolute and qualified. In general, the
Supreme Court has assumed that Congress intended to import the
30
common law immunities enjoyed by government officials into§ 1983.

1.

Absolute Immunity

With the exception of the President, who enjoys absolute immunity
31
from damages for all official acts, absolute immunity is assigned to
government officials based on the function performed when engaged in
32
the challenged conduct, rather than their title or position. Government
officials performing the legislative function are entitled to absolute
immunity, as demonstrated by Supreme Court of Virginia v~ Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., where the Court held that the Virginia
Supreme Court acts in a legislative capacity in promulgating the Virginia
33
Members of
Code of Professional Responsibility governing attorneys.
a committee of the California legislature were entitled to absolute
immunity when sued by an individual challenging the actions of the
34
In holding that the defendants were entitled to absolute
committee.
legislative immunity, the Court relied in part on the spirit of the speech
35
or debate clause in the U.S. Constitution.
This absolute legislative
immunity extends to other officials, such as counsel to a congressional

26

Hafer v. Mclo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991 ).
27
See id.
28

/d. at 25-29
29
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1985).
30
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243-45 ( 1974) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967)).
31
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 ( 1982). But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692-95
( 1997) (holding that the President's immunity from suit for damages docs not apply to unofficial
acts).
32
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 ( 1978).
33
Supreme Court ofVa. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980).
34
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,377-79 (1951).
35
ld. at 372-73 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
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subcommittee, committee staff, and congressional aides, when their
36
In
challenged conduct is within the sphere of legislative activity.
another case, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, the Court extended absolute legislative immunity to members of
37
a regional planning agency for actions taken in a legislative capacity.
Relying on these decisions of the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts extended this absolute immunity to state and local government
38
officials when actions taken in their legislative capacity are challenged.
In Bogan v. Scott-Harris, the Supreme Court approved the extension of
absolute immunity to local government officials performing a legislative
39
function. The Court held that the mayor and a city councilmember were
entitled to absolute immunity for their roles in the enactment of an
ordinance that eliminated the job of a city department head who had
complained about race discrimination by the city. In determining that
these officials enjoyed absolute legislative immunity, the Court noted
that individual hiring and firing decisions are different from the
40
elimination of a position. The Supreme Court confirmed the singular
impact of the function being infonned while engaged in challenged
conduct when the Court held that Senator Proxmire did not enjoy
absolute legislative immunity when he designated someone as the
41
recipient of his ''golden fleece award,"
and that Representative
Passman was not entitled to absolute legislative immunity in a suit
alleging sex discrimination in his decision to discharge a deputy
42
In contrast to the immunity defense in other
administrative assistant.
situations, absolute legislative immunity not only insulates the official
from damages, but also from injunctive and declaratory relief, and
43
attorney fees.
Absolute judicial immunity from damages in § 1983 actions can be
traced to Pierson v. Ray, in which the Court decided that the § 1983
legislative history gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish
44
Eleven
the long-established principle of absolute judicial immunity.

36

Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,507 (1975).
37
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405-06 ( 1979).
38
See, e.g., Biblia Abierta v. Banks, 129 F.3d 899, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1997) (extending absolute
legislative immunity to city aldennan whose actions in introducing and voting for zoning ordinances
were challenged); Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that decision of a town
board to hold a public meeting is protected by absolute legislative immunity, regardless of the
motive behind the meeting).
39
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 ( 1998).
40
/d. at 56.
41
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill, 127-29 (1979).
42
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236 n.ll, 245-49 ( 1979).
43
See Consumers Union ofU.S., Inc., 446 U.S. at733-34 (1980).
44
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 ( 1967). The long-established principle dates back to Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871 ), which held that it is "a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
[should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself." /d. at 347. In Bradley, the Court distinguished judicial actions in ~'excess of jurisdiction''
from a "clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter," with the latter not protected by
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years after the decision in Pierson v. Ray, the Court, in Stump v.
Sparkman, held that an Indiana trial court judge was entitled to absolute
immunity from damages in an action challenging his entry of an order
approving a "tubal ligation" procedure on a fifteen-year-old female based
45
According to the
on an ex parte petition submitted by her mother.
Court, Judge Stump had jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the
broad jurisdiction granted to circuit courts in Indiana had not been
"circumscribed [by statute or case law] to foreclose consideration of a
46
petition for authorization of a minor's sterilization."
Judge Stump
engaged in a "judicial" act because approval of the petition was "a
function non11ally perfortned by a judge," and the expectation of the
parties was that they were dealing with a judge "in his judicial
47
capacity." The informality of the process was not controlling.
Stump confirms that absolute judicial immunity from damages is
extremely broad, and this is further demonstrated by a subsequent case,
Mireles v. Waco, holding that a trial court judge's actions in ordering
police officers "to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring [an
attorney] plaintiff into his courtroom" is protected by absolute judicial
48
immunity even if the judge acted in bad faith or with malice.
Judges
are entitled to qualified, not absolute, immunity when they make
employment decisions related to their staff, as they are not performing a
49
judicial function.
Based on the functional approach approved by the Court in Butz v~
50
Economou, absolute judicial immunity is extended to administrative
51
The Court has been
law judges performing adjudicatory functions.
reluctant to extend absolute judicial immunity to administrative
52
Similarly,
procedures that lack formality and procedural safeguards.
the Court rejected a claim of absolute judicial immunity for members of
a prison disciplinary committee because of the absence of procedural
safeguards and the fact that the members of the committee are
53
subordinates of the warden, rather than independent decision makers.
Like absolute legislative immunity, judicial immunity encompasses

absolute judicial immunity. !d. at 351- 52.
45
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 ( 1978).
46
!d. at 358.
47
/d. at 362.
48
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S, 9, 10-ll (1991).
49
Forrestcrv. White, 484 U.S. 219,230 (1988).
50
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 519 ( 1978).
51
/d. at 514. Lower courts have extended this absolute immunity to parole board members. See, e.g.
Wilson v. Kclkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Clcavingcr v. Saxner, 474 U.S.
193, 206--07 ( 1985) (holding that members of a prison Institution Discipline Committee arc entitled
to qualified, not absolute, immunity); Applewhite v. Briber, 506 F.3d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 2007)
(applying absolute immunity applied to a medical review board's decision to revoke a medical
license).
52
See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (1978) (noting that "safeguards built into the judicial process tend
to reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct").
53
Cleavingcr v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204-06 ( 1985).
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those whose assistance is critical to the judicial function. For example,
54
judicial immunity has been extended to law clerks, contractors or
55
employees performing a function critical to the judicial process, and
5
executive officials who obtain or execute judicial orders. However, in
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., the Court held that a court reporter is
not automatically entitled to absolute judicial inununity where she failed
57
to produce a transcript of a criminal trial. Because of their importance
to the judicial process, the Court held, in Briscoe v. LaHue, that
witnesses who testify at trial, including police officers, are entitled to the
58
However, a complaining
protection of absolute judicial immunity.
witness, including a prosecuting attorney who prepares an affidavit in
support of an application for an arrest warrant, is not protected by
59
absolute judicial immunity.
Prosecuting attorneys, when engaged "in initiating... and in
presenting the [government's] case," act in a quasi-judicial capacity with
broad discretion and are therefore protected by absolute judicial
60
immunity.
However, because this absolute immunity extends only to
the prosecutorial function, the Court has addressed the extent of this
function, as opposed to administrative or police-type functions, in a
number of cases. For example, a prosecutor preparing for the initiation
of a criminal charge or for trial is acting in her role as an advocate for the
government and is entitled to absolute immunity, but when acting as an
investigator, searching for evidence that will provide probable cause for
an arrest, the prosecutor is acting more like a police officer with only
61
qualified immunity. Further, a prosecutor's public announcement of an
indictment containing false statements is not protected by absolute
62
Similarly, statements of a prosecutor in an affidavit
immunity.
supporting an application for an arrest warrant are not part of the
prosecutorial function and, therefore, not protected by absolute
63
prosecutorial immunity. In Burns v. Reed, the Court refused to extend
prosecutorial immunity to a prosecutor who was giving legal advice to

54

See, e.g., Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 2002).
55
See, e.g., Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2006) (extending judicial
immunity to a private psychologist pcrfonning evaluations and making findings pursuant to a
contract with an adjudicative parole board, which relics on the expertise in denying parole).
56
See, e.g., Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525, 531 (8th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that absolute immunity would apply to a juvenile officer who was enforcing a valid
court order, but distinguishing the situation where a juvenile officer's conduct in obtaining a court
order, such as providing inaccurate infonnation to obtain an ex parte order, is in question).
57
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433-34 ( 1993) (noting the absence of absolute
immunity for court reporters at common law). See also Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 907 (2006) (holding that court reporters who allegedly conspired
to defraud a litigant by deliberately altering a transcript do not enjoy absolute judicial immunity).
58
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 ( 1983).
59
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997).
60
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976}.
61
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993).
62
/d. at 277-78.
63
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-31.
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the police.
However, the action of the prosecutor in appearing in court
and presenting evidence in support of an application for a search warrant
is protected by absolute immunity, even if the prosecutor deliberately
65
misled the court.
Another case, Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, examined the
circumstances under which administrative tasks fall within the scope of
66
absolute prosecutorial immunity.
After a successful habeas corpus
action resulting in his release from prison, Goldstein brought a § 1983
action alleging that the prosecution's failure to disclose impeachment
material in his criminal trial resulted from a failure to properly train and
supervise prosecutors, and to establish an infonnation system containing
67
The Court rejected
potential impeachment material about informants.
an automatic exception from absolute immunity for management tasks,
and held that the management tasks at issue in this case concerned how
and when to make impeachment information available at trial and,
therefore, were "directly connected with [a] prosecutor's basic trial
68
advocacy duties." It was obvious that the Court was reluctant to allow
a § 1983 plaintiff to avoid absolute immunity simply by suing
supervisors, rather than the actual trial prosecutor, and casting the claim
as a failure of training or supervision. Lower federal courts have
extended the absolute prosecutorial immunity to other prosecutorial-like
functions, including the prosecution of disciplinary proceedings before
69
state licensing boards.

2.

Qualified Immunity

While the Supreme Court has stated that its "cases make plain that
qualified immunity represents the norm" for "executive officials in
70
general," a more accurate view of qualified immunity is that it is
available to any government official whose challenged actions do not fit
into any one of the functions to which the Court has assigned the
protection of absolute immunity. Because the Court requires a functional
71
approach to absolute immunity, the function of the government official
at issue is a more accurate starting point than either the title or location
Not surprisingly, government officials prefer
within government.

500 u.s. 478,496 (1991).
65
!d. at 488-96.
66
129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
67
/d. at 858-59
68
ld. at 863.
69
See, e.g., Disraeli v. Rotunda, 489 F.3d 628, 632-35 (5th Cir. 2007) (entitling director of state
securities board to absolute prosecutorial immunity in his role as prosecutor in a proceeding against
an investment advisor).
70
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 ( 1982).
71
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 ( 1978).
64
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absolute immunity, but if they cannot characterize their conduct as one
that triggers absolute immunity, they will use qualified immunity as their
second-choice defense. In short, qualified immunity is less preferred
because it is available only when the right asserted is not "clearly
72
established."
When applicable, the qualified immunity defense
protects a government official from personal or individual liability for
damages. While the Court has justified the creation of qualified
immunity as a needed protection for government officials who must
exercise discretion, and encourage them to exercise that discretion in a
73
vigorous manner,
some lower courts have broadly construed the
meaning of "discretionary" in order to expand· the availability of
74
qualified immunity.
Other courts enforce the distinction between
discretionary and ministerial actions, denying qualified immunity when a
75
govennnent official is engaged in a ministerial act.
In addition to the perceived deterrence caused by potential personal
liability resulting from a government official's exercise of discretion, the
Court has identified what it calls "social costs" resulting from such
claims, including the expense of litigation, tbe distraction of the official's
attention and energy away from the duties of office, and a deterrence to
76
qualified individuals from either seeking or accepting public office.
All of the concerns identified by the Court are based on assumptions,
77
rather than empirical data.
The Court's current version of the qualified immunity defense does
not include. the subjective compone.nt, malicious intent, i?entified in
7
Wood v. Strickland. In Harlow v. Fztzgerald, the Court dectded that the
inclusion of the subjective element made it too easy for plaintiffs to
avoid summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense and,

72

13

ld. at 479.

See, e.g., id at 506; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974).
74
See, -e .g._, Hudson v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that even though a state
statute provides that law enforcement officers "shall arrest" one governed by a protective order if
there is reasonable cause to bc1ievc the order has been violated, the reasonable cause provision
introduces discretion); Gray v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303--04 (lith Cir. 2006) (holding a deputy
sheriff serving as a resource officer at an elementary school was exercising discretionary authority
when detaining and handcuffing a student); DeArmon v. Burgess, 38-8 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 2004)
(deciding the so-called ministerial functions exception to the qualified immunity doctrine_is narrow
and applies only if an officer violated a statute or regulation specifying a precise action that the
officer must take and state law creates the cause of action).
15
See, e.g., Grotcn v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (the refusal by government
officials to provide a real estate appraiser with the materials needed to apply for temporary and
reciprocal licenses involve ministerial acts not protected by qualified immunity).
76
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
77
If a concern about personal liability for damages really deters qualified individuals from seeking
or accepting public office, there should be-evidence to support the Court's assumption. If states and
local governments sec this as a concern, they can address it by paying judgments entered against
their officials. See, e.g., IND. CODE§ 34-13-4-1 (2003) (requiring the governmental entity to pay
any judgment, other than for punitive damages, and allowing the entity to pay a judgment for
punitive damages if it "is in the best interest of the_governmental entity").
78
420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Government officials will not be protected by qualified immunity if(a)
they knew or reasonably should have known that the action taken violated the federal rights of the
plaintiff, or (b) they took the action with malicious intent to cause a deprivation of rights. /d.
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therefore, it was abandoned.
After Harlow, in Davis v. Scherer, the
Court made it clear that the qualified immunity defense is the same for
state and local government officials as it is for federal government
80
Davis also clarified that acting contrary to state law will not
officials.
affect a state or local government official's qualified immunity defense
in a § 1983 action because the focus is on whether the federal right the
plaintiff seeks to enforce was clearly established at the time of the
81
challenged action.
Finally, even if the right asserted by the plaintiff was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct, government officials
may still be protected by qualified immunity if they can show
82
For example, in a case seeking damages
extraordinary circumstances.
from the administrator of a state hospital, the Court indicated such a
"professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal
professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a
83
situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability."
In sum, federal, state, and local government officials, who at the
time of the challenged conduct were not engaged in a function that
triggers absolute immunity, will be entitled to qualified immunity from
individual or personal liability for damages unless the plaintiff shows
that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct. Of course, the parties will dispute the meaning of
"clearly established." This determination is difficult because whether
government officials have violated the Constitution often turns on the
specific facts of the situation. For example, while it is clearly established
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether a particular search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment will turn on the facts. The Court made this clear in
Anderson v. Creighton, in which it said:
[O]ur cases establish that the right the official is alleged to
have violated must have been "clearly established" in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

79

457 U.S. 800, 818. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (confirrning that a
government official's subjective belief about the legality of her conduct is not a factor); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 ( 1986) (stating that qualified immunity ''provides ample protection to all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law," i.e., a government official's
knowledge that her action is unlawful makes her ineligible for the protection of qualified immunity).
80
468 u.s. 183, 194-95 ( 1984).
81
/d. at 194 n.l2.
82
Harlow, 451 U.S. at 818-19 ("[i]f the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard, the defense should be sustained").
83
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,323 (1982). Courts have considered reliance on the advice of
counsel as a factor in dctcnnining whether there arc extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Suciro
Vazquez v. Torregrosa de Ia Rosa, 494 F.3d 227, 234-36 (1st Cir. 2007); Revis v. Meldrum, 489
F.3d 273, 286-95 (6th Cir. 2007); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34-36 (1st Cir. 2004); Dixon v.
Wallowa Cnty., 336 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003).
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This creates a tension with the Court's desire to have the qualified
immunity defense determined early in the case, preferably at the
summary judgment stage before the government official seeking
immunity expends substantial time and resources responding to
discovery. If the plaintiff is required to show that the alleged Fourth
Amendment right, for example, was clearly established as to her
particular situation, discovery may be necessary to establish the contours
of the situation. While the Court in Crawford-£/ v. Britton rejected a
heightened state of mind requirement or a heightened evidentiary
standard where subjective intent is an element of the underlying
constitutional claim, it concluded that lower courts should limit and tailor
85
early discovery to issues related to the qualified immunity defense.
The district courts' inclination to rely on holdings in their own
circuit to determine whether a right is clearly established is approved by
86
the .S upreme Court.
It is not uncommon for the circuits to split
holdings on a specific aspect of a constitutional right: the Court in Wilson
81
v~ Layne addressed that situation indicating a right is not clearly
established if plaintiffs cannot identify ''any cases of controlling
authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident which clearly
established the rule on which they seek to rely" and fail to "identif[y] a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer
88
could not have believed that his actions were lawful."
A split in the
circuits, according to the Court, is normally an indication that the right
89
was not clearly established at the time of the incident.
More recently, however, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Court rejected the
argument that plaintiffs must point to facts in previous cases that were
"materially similar" to their situation in order to avoid the qualified
90
immunity defense. Rather, the Court detennined that "officials can still
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel
91
factual circumstances." The plaintiff need only show that government
officials had a "fair warning" that their conduct violated clearly
92
established law. In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,
the Court applied Wilson and Hope to find a strip search of a thirteenyear-old student violative of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in
'

'

'

483 u.s. 635,640 (1987)
85
523 U.S. 574, 598-600 (1998)
M
.
.
.
E.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 (1984); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.8. 478, 488, 506
(1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 ( 1978) (all approving the practice of following
precedent established by lower courts in detennining whether a right is clearly established).
87
526 u.s. 603 (1999).
88
!d. at 617.
89
!d. at 618.
90
536 u.s. 730, 753 (2002)
91
/d. at 741.
92
ld. at 739-40 (noting that violation of a state regulation could be a factor in deterrnining whether
the officials had a "fair warning").
84
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Noting that the lower courts reached "divergent
conclusions" regarding the application of the T.L. 0. standard to school
searches, the Court held that the school officials were entitled to
qualified immunity because ''the cases viewing school strip searches
differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with wellreasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were
94
sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law."
However, the Court
said it was
not suggest[ing] that entitlement to qualified immunity is the
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other
federal, or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or
even a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right
does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been
95
clear.
Since the "clearly established" issue raises a question of law, it is
subject to de novo review on appeal, and the Court made it easier for
defendants to prevail on the qualified immunity defense by holding that
appellate courts should consider all relevant precedent, even precedent
96
that was not presented to or considered by the trial court.
The Court's interpretation of "clearly established," along with its
recognition of several defendant-friendly procedural rules addressed in
the next section, has interfered significantly with the ability of plaintiffs
to recover damages in § 1983 actions and frequently leaves them without
a remedy, even when they establish a constitutional violation.

3.

Procedural Aspects of the Immunity Defense

Some of the procedural aspects of the immunity defense were
discussed above, in the context of describing the "clearly established''
97
aspect of qualified immunity, such as the absence of a heightened
98
pleading requirement and the limitation on discovery. There are
several other procedural rules the Court has deemed applicable to the
immunity defense, most of which are designed to enhance its value to
government officials. First, in Gomez v. Toledo, the Court treated
qualified immunity as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the

93

129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009) (applying the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in New Jersey v.
TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
94
Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
9s Id.
96

Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515-16 ( 1994).
97
See supra Part li.A.2.
98
But see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (holding that a complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"').
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defendant government official in accordance with the Federal Rules of
99
Civil Procedure. When not pleaded properly, affirmative defenses may
be waived; however, courts are fairly lenient in allowing defendants to
100
raise the defense, even if omitted in the initial answer.
Second, the Court detertnined in Mitchell v. Forsyth that qualified
immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
101
Consistent with this concept of immunity, the Court, in
liability."
Hunter v. Bryant, also determined that immunity "ordinarily should be
102
decided by the court long before trial,"
meaning that defendant
government officials are encouraged to raise the immunity defense either
in a motion to dismiss or more commonly in a motion for summary
103
judgment.
Consistent with the "immunity from suit" aspect of immunity, in
Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Court held that a trial court order rejecting the
104
immunity defense is immediately appealable as a "final decision."
Forsyth invoked the "collateral order rule," pursuant to which a decision
is deemed final if it is separate and independent of the merits and
effectively unreviewable on appeal if an immediate appeal is not
105
The fact that an order denying summary judgment is
allowed.
immediately appealable as a collateral order does not mean the defendant
must appeal it at that point. Rather, the defendant may choose to wait
until there is a truly final decision and then challenge the order denying
106
When a defendant appeals the order denying immunity
immunity.
immediately, as a collateral order, the trial court is divested of
jurisdiction, thus delaying the progress of the suit · for months, if not
107
years.
If a government official files an immediate appeal based on
Forsyth, the issues on appeal are limited to those raised by the immunity

99

Gomez, 446 U.S. 635, 640 41 (1980). See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). While not at issue in Gomez, there
is no reason why the absolute immunity defense should not be treated the same. See, e.g., Tully v.
Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 20 I 0) ("[ d]efcndants waived their absolute-immunity defense by
failing to raise it in the district court.").
100
See, e.g.; Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 305-06 (4th Cir. 2006);
Stephenson v. Doc, 332 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2003); Eddy v. V. I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d
204, 207-10 (3d Cir. 2001 ).
101
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 ( 1985), emphasis in original. Similarly, absolute
immunity is treated as an immunity from suit. /d. at 525.
102
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 ( 1991 ).
103
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,307-09 (1996)
t04 472 U.S. at 512. Nounally, 28 U .S.C. § 1291 requires a final decision before there may be an
appeal.
105
Forsyth, 4 72 U.S. at 526. See also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 91 I, 916-17 ( 1977) (holding that
the appealability of a state court order denying the immunity defense is dependent on state law).
106
See, e.g., Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 762-63 (lOth Cir. 2006); Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d
881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001 ); Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty, I 08 F .3d 486, 492 (3d Cir.
1997). The Court agreed to hear Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. App'x 449 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
130 S. Ct. 2371 (20 l 0), to address the question whether a party may "appeal an order denying
summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before
trial."
107
See, e.g., Stewart v. Dongcs, 915 F.2d 572, 574-79 (I Oth Cir. 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d
1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1989).
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defense.
However, the Court did not preclude a narrow exception
where a portion of the order that is not immediately appealable is
"inextricably intertwined" with the immunity decision, or where review
of the portion of the decision that is not immediately appealable is
109
"necessary to ensure meaningful review" of the immunity issue.
For
example, an order granting partial summary judgment for a plaintiff
detennining liability on a constitutional claim was considered on appeal
of an order denying summary judgment on the qualified immunity
0
defense. II
In another defendant-friendly case, Behrens v. Pelletier, the Court
held that a government official is entitled to an immediate appeal of an
order denying the immunity defense, even though that defendant will
have to go to trial on other claims, such as an application for prospective
equitable relief, if in fact the plaintiff establishes a violation of the
11
federal right. I
The Court in Behrens also held that a government
112
official is not limited to one collateral order appeal based on Forsyth.
For example, if a defendant raises the immunity defense in a motion to
dismiss and immediately appeals unsuccessfully the order denying the
motion to dismiss, that defendant could file another collateral order
appeal, based on Forsyth, after a denial of a motion for summary
113
judgment raising the immunity defense.
Not surprisingly, the decision in Forsyth has raised some difficult
questions where the denial of summary judgment on the immunity
defense is based on unresolved factual disputes. This question arose in
Johnson v. Jones, and the Court held that an order denying summary
judgment on the immunity defense is not immediately appealable when
114
the order addresses only a question of the sufficiency of the evidence.
A year later, in Behrens, the Court clarified Johnson, stating that
determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at summary
judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they
happen to arise in a qualified immunity case; if what is at
issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than
whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly
"separable" from the plaintiffs claim, and hence there is no

108

Swint v. Chambers Cnty Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995).
109
/d. at 51. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-19 ( 1995) (recognizing that the exercise
of pendent appellate jurisdiction may sometimes be appropriate).
110
Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 989-91 (9th Cir. 2009).
111
516 U.S. 299,307, citing Mitchcll472 U.S. 511,526 (1996). Note that a finding of a violation of
a constitutional right, for purposes of equitable relief, is not inconsistent with a detcnnination that a
government official is entitled to immunity from individual liability for damages.
112
Behrens, 516 U.S. at 308.
113
/d. at 307-09.
114
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313.
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115

However, the Court held that the defendant could immediately
appeal seeking review of the legal question whether, accepting the
plaintiffs version of the facts, the conduct violated clearly established
116
In short, the decisions in Johnson and Behrens invite procedural
law.
disputes related to the immunity defense that effectively place the case
on hold, thus delaying the plaintiffs opportunity to get to the merits and
increasing the cost of litigating the case.
Another procedural dispute concerns the order in which the courts
should address the issues raised when a government official asserts the
qualified immunity defense. In Saucier v. Katz, where the plaintiff
alleged the use of excessive force by a federal officer in violation of the
117
Fourth Amendment,
the Court said that the lower courts, in
considering the qualified immunity defense, should first consider the
threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct
118
If the answer is no, there is no need for
violated a constitutional right?
further inquiry relating to the defense and the plaintiff loses on the merits
119
of that claim.
However, if the answer is yes, then the court must
determine whether "in light of the specific context of the case,'' the force
used violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment protection so that
120
the officer was not entitled to immunity.
In addressing this issue, the
Court said "[a]n officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts
but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of
force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what
the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the
121
immunity defense."
This approach forced the lower courts to always
make a decision on the merits of the constitutional claim. Only if the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on that question would it be necessary
to address the "clearly established" issue.
Eight years later, the Court reexamined this two-step process in
122
Pearson v. Callahan, and decided to modify it. The Court recognized
the two-step process was beneficial because there are cases in which
there would be little if any conservation of judicial resources by
beginning and ending with a discussion of the "clearly established"
123
prong.
However, after recognizing the benefits, the Court noted that

115

Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313.
116 /d.
.
117
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (200 1).
us /d. at 20 l.
119 /d.
120 /d.
121

/d. at 205.
122
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
123
/d. at 818.
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These
these benefits are frequently offset by other considerations.
include the often unnecessary litigation of constitutional issues that
wastes both courts' and parties' resources; the consideration of whether
there is a constitutional violation may be short-changed where the court
has already determined there was not a violation of clearly established
law; and the two-step process departs from the general rule that courts
125
should not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary.
The
Court then concluded that the benefits of the two-step process can be
retained and the disadvantages avoided by allowing lower court judges
"to determine the order of decisionmaking [that] will best facilitate the
126
ln sum, ''while the
fair and efficient disposition of each case~"
sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer
127
be regarded as mandatory."

B.

Governmental Entity Immunity
1.

Limited Liability of Municipal Entities

It is apparent from the discussion of individual immunities in Part
ILA that it is not uncommon for a § 1983 plaintiff to establish a violation
of a federal constitutional right but be denied an award of damages from
the responsible individual because of absolute and/or qualified immunity.
This situation would not be so devastating if the victim of
unconstitutional action by a government official could recover from that
official's employer, as is frequently the case when a government official
engages in tortious conduct. However, while the Court in Monell v.
128
Department of Social Services
held that a municipality is a "person''
within the meaning of § 1983 and could be sued as a defendant in such
129
an action,
the Court also held that municipalities could not be liable
130
Rather, "[i]t is when execution of
based on respondeat superior.
government's policy or custom, whether made by its law makers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
111
§ 1983."
This means a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only (i)

/d.
125
Jd. at 818-21.
126
/d. at 821.
127
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
12
g 436 u.s. 658, 690 ( 1978).
129
/d. at 691.
130 /d.
131
/d. at 694
124
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if one or more of its
policy in violating
official responsible
132
policymakers,
or
municipal custom

officials acted in accordance with official municipal
the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (ii) when the
for the violation was one of the municipality-'s
(iii) where a government acts in accordance with
demonstrated by repetition of the same challenged
133
misconduct over a period of time,
or by a policy or custom of
inadequate training, failure to supervise, or inadequate screening of
134
applicants for a position.
Establishing municipal liability based on
inade,q uate training, failure to supervise, or inadequate screening of
135
applicants is very difficult.
136
In City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
the Court held that a
municipality is. not liable for damages under § 1983 based on a policy
that may cause constitutional deprivations where in-d ividual employees,
acting pursuant to the deficient policy, inflicted no constitutional harm
137
on the plaintiff.
Further, states and state agencies are not liable under
§ 1983 because the Court, in Will v. Michigan Departn1enl of State
Police, held that neither a state, a state agency, nor a state official acting
in his or her official capacity is considered a Hperson" subject to suit
138
under § 1983.
Where a plaintiff is successful in establishing
municipal liability under Monell, the municipality is not protected by
139
absolute or qualified immunity.
However, municipal entities cannot

132

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see also McMillian v. Monroe Cnty.,
520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997) (requiring a functional analysis to determine whether the government
official had policymaking authority with respect to the specific function at issue in the challenged
conduct, i.e., a government official may be a policymaker with respect to some functions, but not
others); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. ll2, 128-29 (1988) (holding that a policymakcr's
acquiescence to the actions of a subordinate is not necessarily sufficient to impose liability on the
municipality); Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown,520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (holding that in a situation
where a municipality does not directly violate nor authorize the-deprivation of a plaintiffs rights, the
courts must apply Hrigorous standards of culpability and causation'; in order to ' cnsurc that the
municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee").
33
i See, e.g., Baron v. Suffolk Cnty Sheriff's Dep't, 402 F.Jd 225, 236-41 (I st Cir. 2005) (requiring
a practice or custom so widespread that municipal policymakcrs had actual or constructive
knowledge and took no action to end the practice). But see Rhyne v. Henderson Co., 973 F.2d 386,
394, 392 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the failure of a municipality to adopt an official policy on a
particular subject may not serve as a basis for liability unless the omission "amount[s] to an
intentional choice, not merely an unintentional negligent oversight'').
134
See Brown, 520 U.S. at 410-11 (holding that inadequate screening of an applicant's background
would trigger municipal liability only where inadequate scrutiny of the applicant's background
would have led a reasonable policymakcr to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the
decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of somconc's protected constitutional rights);
Canton, 489 U.S. at 392 (1989)
(holding
that a constitutional violation arises from inadequate
.
.
training or supervision only where it constitutes dcliberatc indifference" to the rights of the persons
with whom the employees come into contact; the deliberate indifference standard is met only where
"the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakcrs of the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need"').
135
See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. ,a t 405; Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-93.
136
475 U.S. 796 (1986).
137
/d. at 799.
138
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 ( 1989).
139
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) .
4
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be held liable for punitive damages under § 1983.
When you combine the protection of absolute and qualified
immunity with the limitations Monell imposes upon municipal liability, it
is apparent that many victims of unconstitutional action by local
governmental officials and employees are without a remedy for damages
under § 1983. In Part II.B.ii below, we will see that victims of
unconstitutional action by state officials and employees have even less of
a chance of recovering damages under§ 1983.

2.

Eleventh Amendment Protection for States and State
Agencies

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
141
State.
Passed in response to the Court's decision in Chisholm v.
142
Georgia,
permitting a suit by citizens of South Carolina against
Georgia for the purpose of collecting a debt in a situation where Georgia
had not consented to suit, the Eleventh Amendment on its face does not
address § 1983 actions brought against a state by a citizen of that state.
143
the Court held that the Eleventh
However, in Hans v. Louisiana,
Amendment bars federal suits against a state by its own citizens,
concluding that Article III was intended to pem1it states to be sued only
when they consented and that the Eleventh Amendment more broadly
144
The decision in Hans
restored the common law notion of sovereignty.
leads to the anomalous result that constitutional rights provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment, including those incorporated through the Due
Process Clause, cannot be enforced in a § 1983 action, even though the
primary purpose of § 1983 was to provide a cause of action against the
states that were either unable or unwilling to comply with the mandates
of the Fourteenth Amendment The Court has since recognized a few
ways to avoid the holding in Hans.

°City of Newport v . Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-71 (1981).

14

U. s. cONST. amend. XI.
142
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 ( 1793).
143
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
144
See also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 , 760 (2002) (holding that the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment
and bars federal agency adjudication of a complaint by a private party claiming an ann of the state
violated a federal statute).
141
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First, in Ex parte Young,
the Court held that state officials may
be sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. The
government official is deemed to be "stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the
146
consequences of his individual conduct."
This results in the legal
fiction in which the action of the government official is deemed state
action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and under color of law
for purposes of § 1983, but it is not deemed to be a state action for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Ex parte Young remains the law
today, although its use has been limited by Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
147
Florida,
holding that a court should hesitate before applying Young
"where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
148
enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right."
It was also
limited by Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, in which an Indian
tribe was not allowed to use the Ex parte Young exception because,
according to the Court, it raised an issue that is "unusual in that the
tribe's suit is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action which
149
implicates special sovereignty interests."
Second, the Court held that states may waive their Eleventh
Amendment protection and consent to being sued in federal court;
150
however, such waivers must be explicit.
In Lapides v. Board of
Regents of University System of Georgia, the Court held that, by
removing a case from state to federal court, a state waives its Eleventh
151
Amendment protection.
Lower courts have held that a state also
waives its Eleventh Amendment protection by accepting federal funds
pursuant to a statute that provides, in clear and unmistakable terrns, that a
recipient may be held liable in federal court for violations of, for
152
example, a provision in the statute prohibiting discrimination.
Third, the Court held that Congress may abrogate Eleventh
153
Amendment immunity,
but this has been limited to circumstances
where Congress passes legislation pursuant to its power under Section 5
154
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If it intends to abrogate Eleventh

145

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. I 23 ( 1908).
146
/d. at 160.
147
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996).
148
/d. at 74.
149
521 U.S. 261, 281 ( 1997).
150
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldcnnan, 465 U.S. 89, 99- 100 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 673 ( 1974). See also United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 578 F .3d 722, 725-27
(8th Cir. 2008); New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d I, 18 (1st Cir. 2004).
151
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002).
152
See, e.g., Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197-203 (3d Cir.
2008); Diaz-Fonscca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Uni., 411 F.3d 474, 491-506 (4th Cir. 2005).
153
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1976) (holding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 abrogates states' Eleventh Amendment protection and subjects them to liability for
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII).
154
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1996) (holding that Congress may not
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Amendment immunity, Congress must express its intent in clear and
155
unmistakable terms on the face of the statute.
While the power to
abrogate gives Congress the power to ameliorate some of the
consequences of Hans, the power has been limited substantially by the
Court's narrow interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Following City of Boerne, the Court ruled that several civil rights acts
passed by Congress, which attempted to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment protection, were unconstitutional because they exceeded the
156
Section 5 power of Congress.
Also beginning in City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
157
(RFRA)
exceeded the Section 5 power of Congress because it was not
"congruent and proportionate" in light of the narrow scope of the Section
158
1 right.
Although the Section 1 right to religious freedom is very
limited after Smith, requiring only that state and local governments act
rationally in passing laws of general applicability that conflict with
159
religious freedom,
RFRA required state and local government to
satisfy strict scrutiny when passing laws of general applicability that
160
conflict with religious freedom.
Because the Court held in Edelman v. Jordan that Congress in
passing § 1983 did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
161
states and state agencies,
and in Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police that states and state agencies are not persons subject to suit under
162
§ 1983,
it is not possible to sue states pursuant to § 1983 for violations
163
of federal constitutional and statutory rights.
While state officials are
subject to § 1983 actions seeking damages in their individual capacity,
they can raise an absolute and/or qualified immunity defense. This means
that many violations of federal rights by state government officials will

abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passes legislation pursuant to its Article I power).
155
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (200 I) (finding clear
congressional intent to abrogate Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act but a lack of
congruence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73-74 (2000) (finding a lack of clear
congressional intent in Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
156
E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (200 I) (Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
( 1999) (Patent Remedy Act). Compare Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (familycare leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act).
157
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (2006).
158
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-34. The relevant Section 1 .right is the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment, which is subject to only rational basis review in circumstances where a
religious-neutral law of general applicability has an incidental effect on religious freedom, based on
the decision in Employment Div., Dep 't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990).
159
Employment Div., Dep 't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990).
160
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (providing that "[g]ovemmcnt may substantially burden a person ~s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-( I) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.")
161
415 U.S. 651,673 (1974).
162
Will v. Mich. Dcp't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 ( 1989).
163
/d. at 64-66.
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not be remedied.

C.

Supervisory Liability

There are at least three reasons why § 1983 plaintiffs may want to
hold supervisors personally liable for the actions of their subordinates:
First, the supervisor is more likely to be a policymaker and this could
trigger municipal liability based on Monell; second, supervisors are more
likely to have resources from which plaintiffs could satisfy a judgment;
and third, a judgment against a supervisor is more likely to lead to a
change in tbe municipal culture, customs, practices or policies that
facilitated the challenged conduct that led to the judgment. The law
surrounding supervisory liability in § 1983 actions is unclear, but
somewhat analogous to municipal liability after Monell.
In a § 1983 action against the mayor, the police commissioner, and
others alleging a pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police
mistreatment of racial minorities, the plaintiff sought equitable relief
164
addressing the alleged mistreatment.
The trial court found that the
evidence did not show· a policy on the part of the defendants to violate
the legal and constitutional rights of the plaintiff classes, but did find
evidence of a tendency to discourage civilian complaints and to minimize
165
the consequences of police misconduct.
After noting that individual
police officers not named as defendants ·" were found to have violated the
constitutional rights of particular individuals," the Court said "there was
no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of
police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by [defendants]
express or otherwise showing their authorization or approval of such
166
misconduct."
The Court overturned the equitable relief.
Later, in Monell, the Court said Rizzo rejected the argument that
§ 1983 liability may be premised on ''the mere right to control without
any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to
167
supervise."
Relying on Rizzo and Monell, a majority of the circuits
have required plaintiffs who are attempting to hold supervisors liable
based on a failure to supervise rather than affirmative misconduct to
show either gross negligence or deliberate indifference, with some

164

•

.

.

Rtzzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
165
Council of Org. on Phila. Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289,
1317 (E. D. Pa. 1973).
166
!d. at 371. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, saw it differently and pointed to the district court's
finding that it 'is the policy of the department to discourage the filing of such complaints, to avoid or
minimize the consequences of provc.n police misconduct, and to resist disclosure of the final
disposition of such complaints." !d. at 386 (quoting Council of Org. on Phila. Police Accountability
and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
167
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Scrvs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 ( 1978).
4
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168

circuits requiring "knowledge and acquiescence."
169
While not in the context of a § 1983 action, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
the Court considered the "supervisory liability" of the former Attorney
General, John Ashcroft, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Robert Mueller, in an action by an alleged terrorist
claiming that Ashcroft and Mueller "adopted an unconstitutional policy
that subjected [him] to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his
170
After noting that the plaintiff
race, religion, or national origin."
"correctly concedes that Government officials may not be held liable for
the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
171
respondeat superior,"
the Court said "[w]here the claim is invidious
discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our
decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the
172
Imposing a heightened
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose."
pleading requirement, the Court said the plaintiff would have to "plead
sufficient factual matter to show that [defendants] adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral,
investigative reason, but for the purpose of discriminating on account of
173
race, religion, or national origin.''
Rejecting the argument that ''a
supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose
amounts to the supervisor's violating the Constitution," the Court said
"[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action where masters do not answer for
the torts of their servants the term 'supervisory liability' is a
misnomer," and each government official "is only liable for his or her
174
The Court went on to hold that the plaintiffs
own misconduct."
allegations were nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the
elements" of a constitutional discrimination claim that were not entitled
to an assumption of truth and did not nudge the claims of invidious
175
discrimination "across the line from conceivable to plausible."
Therefore, based on Iqbal, plaintiffs in Bivens actions, and
presumably in § 1983 actions, must allege plausible facts showing the
defendant supervisors were personally involved in the claimed

168

See, e.g., Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 584 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (lith Cir. 2009); Goodman
v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395- 96 (5th Cir. 2009); Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (I st Cir.
2008); Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2006).
169
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937 (2009).
170
ld. at 1942. Federal officials arc not subject to suit based on § 1983 because absent special
circumstances they do not act under color of state or local law. However, federal officials may be
subject to suit based on an implied right of action to enforce the Constitution. This is often referred
to as a "Bivens action," based on the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), holding there is an implied right of action to enforce provisions of the U.S.
Constitution against federal officials. See Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (20 I 0).
171
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
172 /d.
173
/d. at 1948-49.
174
/d. at 1949.
175
ld. at 1951-52.

2010] Congress Needs to Repair the Court's Damage to§ 1983

53

176

constitutional violation.
Justice Souter's dissent in Iqbal indicates that
the majority's reasoning eliminates supervisory liability, stating that the
"nature of a supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be
liable, under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates,
177
and it is this very principle that the majority rejects."
It remains to be
seen whether the dissent is correct.

D.

"State Action" and Action Under Color of Law

As a general rule, the individual rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, including those incorporated through the Due
Process Clause, restrict only government action. Private parties are
subject to these constitutional restrictions only when their conduct is
fairly attributable to state or local government. While not necessarily
identical, the "under color of [state law]" requirement in§ 1983 similarly
limits § 1983 actions to claims against state and local government
178
officials.
In short, the actions of state and local government officials,
employees, and agents, taken in their official capacity, generally
179
constitute state action, while the actions of private parties generally do
not. There is a relatively narrow band of cases that straddle the linethose where private parties act in conjunction with government officials,
perform the work or a function of government, or act with the specific
assistance of government and the Supreme Court has not given clear,
principled guidance in determining whether § 1983 and the Constitution

176

See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009); Maldonado v. Fontancs, 568 F.3d
263, 274 n.7 (lst Cir. 2009) (noting that after Iqbal, there is doubt as to whether a public official
may be held vicariously liable under § 1983 based on a supervisory liability theory). See also
Symposium: Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2010). But see Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,
580 F.3d 949, 974-77 (9th Cir. 2009) (supervisors may be held liable for subordinates' actions that
they set in motion or knowingly refuse to terminate, for improper training or supervision, for
acquiescing in the constitutional deprivations, or for conduct showing a reckless or callous
indifference to others' rights. Allegations that Ashcroft developed and set in motion a policy of using
the material witness statute to arrest and preventively detain and interrogate terrorism suspects,
absent probable cause that they committed a crime, satisfied this standard).
177
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957-58. (Souter, J., dissenting).
178
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. , 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) (noting that private defendants
who meet the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment will be deemed to be acting
"under the color of state law" and subject to suit under § 1983). See also Brentwood Academy v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. ,
398 u.s. 144, 152 (1970).
179
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U .S. 167, 171-72 (1961) (finding that government officials may act
under color of state law even though acting contrary to state law). In other words, § 1983 docs not
require that a government official be acting pursuant to a state statute; rather, "[ m ]isuse of power
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law, is taken 'under the color of state law."' /d. at 184 (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding
that a public defender sued for an alleged violation of constitutional rights in representing a client
was not acting under color of law because a public defender exercises professional independence in
representing a claim against the state).
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are in play.
The easiest case for subjecting a private individual to a § 1983
action arises where the private party and a government official act
180
jointly. This sometimes occurs pursuant to a statutory scheme,
and
other times results from an agreement or conspiracy between private
181
individuals and government officials.
In contrast, private conduct
authorized by state law, but not compelled, does not trigger § 1983
182
liability.
When private parties perfonn a public function that is exclusively
and traditionally assigned to government, they may be subject to § 1983
183
liability.
This doctrine has been substantially narrowed recently, and
the Court has refused to subject certain parties to § 1983 liability.
184
Examples of this include a provider of utility services, .the operator of
a nursing home that is funded almost exclusively with government185
provided medical .assistance)
and a provider of education to special
186
needs children pursuant to an agreement with government.
These
cases become more complicated in circumstances where the government
contracts with a private party to perform a governmental function, such
as the operation of a jail or prison. The Court, in West v. Atkins, held that
a private physician who contracted with the state to provide medical
services at a state hospital is subject to § 1983 liability, at least in part
because the physician was fulfilling the government's statutory or
187
constitutional obligation to provide medical services.
However,
private parties who contract with government to provide services are not
188
automatically subjected to§ 1983 liability~
Government assistance to a private party can take many forms.
Financial assistance alone is insufficient to trigger application of either
§ 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, .a "symbiotic

180

See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. 922 at 937 (1982) (pre-judgment attachment pursuant to a statute
imposing a duty on the court clerk and the sheriff that is triggered by a private lawsuit); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co.,, Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 622-28 (1981) (a peremptory challenge scheme
pursuant to which a private litigant motivated by race identifies a potential juror who is then excused
by the judge).
181
See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (a public defender, who is nonnally not
subject to § 1983 liability for actions taken in representing a client, is subject to § 1983 liability
arising out of a conspiracy between the public defender and state pfficials); Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24, 28-29 ( 1980) (private individual who bribes a judge is subject to suit under § 1983 even
though the judge enjoys absolute irnmunity); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 83 (1967)
(federal officials, not normally subject to suit under § 1983, may be subjected to § 1983 liability
when acting in concert with state officials).
182
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978).
183
See. e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506--08 (1946) (private company operating a
municipality); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, .662-64 ( 1944) (a private political club effectively
controlling a local election) .
184
.
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1974).
185
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982).
186
Rendell- Baker v. Kohn; 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
187
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-57 ( 1988).
188
See, e.g., Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 584-85 (8th Cir. 2006); Leshko v.
Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir. 2005).
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relationship" between government and a private party was sufficient in
189
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
to support a § 1983 action
190
This case may represent the outer limits of
against the private owner.
state action, decided at a time when the Court was quite interested in
191
More recently, in Brentwood
addressing racial discrimination.
192
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,
the
Court held that a "private" statewide voluntary association, consisting of
both public and private schools, is subject to the restraints of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the "pervasive
193
Several
entwinement of public institutions and public officials."
factors were considered in reaching this conclusion, including the
dominant role of public schools and their officials in the membership and
governance of the association, the assignment of state board of education
members to serve ex officio on the governing body of the association,
and the eligibility of association employees for membership in the state
194
This case might be viewed as government
retirement system.
delegation of the supervision of public high school athletic activities to a
private association.
Another form of government assistance is found in Shelley v.
195
Kraemer,
a case in which white property owners filed suit in state
court to enforce a racially restrictive covenant and block a sale from a
white owner to a black buyer. Of course, the action of a state court is
government action subject to Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983
restrictions. In Shelley, the state court was asked to assist the white
196
property owners in their enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant.
Shelley is unremarkable in the sense that the judicial branch of
government was an instrument of racial discrimination. The Court held
"that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in
these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the
197
laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand."
While Shelley would arguably support a finding of state action any time a
private party brings a lawsuit with a discriminatory intent, e.g., a private

189

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961} (holding that the private operator of a
restaurant, who leased space from the government and refused to serve African-American customers,
was subject to liability under § 1983).
190
!d. at 725.
191
The Court pointed to the mutual benefit from the arrangement, id. at 724, but the Court has not
relied on the "symbiotic relationship" theory since Burton.
192
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
193
Id. at 298.
194
/d. at 298-303.
195
334 U.S. l ( 1948).
196
For a contrary approach, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), in which the state court
accepted the resignation of a city as the trustee of park property designated in a will as available for
white people only and appointed new trustees who would carry out the discriminatory purpose of the
deceased. The Court found government action because it found that the park was still run as a
municipal park, even after the new trustees took control.
197
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
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landlord sues to evict a tenant because of her race, it has not been
interpreted this broadly.
Government assistance in the form of a state-granted monopoly to
198
operate a public utility, or in the form of a liquor license for a private
199
club which refused to serve a black customer, was deemed insufficient
to convert the private party's action into government action. In Norwood
v. Harrison, the Court held that the action of the executive secretary of
the Mississippi State Textbook Purchasing Board in loaning books to
students attending private schools that discriminated on the basis of race
200
While it was not remarkable to
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
hold that the action of the state official constitutes state action, a more
interesting question is whether the Court would have enjoined the private
school, which benefitted from the state assistance, from discriminating
.
f
.
d
.
.
201
on t he basts o race In a mtsstons.
While the state action doctrine has always been unclear, it is
apparent that the Court, with the exception of Brentwood, has moved
toward a more restrictive interpretation of state action. In other words,
the current Court is less willing to subject private parties to the
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. As the line
between the private and government spheres becomes more blurred, and
government increasingly utilizes private parties to perform government
functions, constitutional protections may shrink.

E.

Limitations on the Amount of Punitive Damages

In a series of cases, beginning with Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v.
202
Oberg,
the Court has invoked due process, both substantive and
procedural, as a means of imposing limitations on the amount of punitive
damages awarded, usually by a jury. In Oberg the Court held that
Oregon's constitutional prohibition on judicial review of the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury '"unless the court can affirmatively

198

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 ( 1974).
199
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1 972).
200
413
455 (1973).
201
But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (affinning the holding of the California
Supreme Court that a constitutional amendment (Proposition 14) designed to overturn state laws that
prohibited race discrimination in selling or leasing real property constitutes an express state
authorization of private race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
202
512 U.S. 415 ( 1994). In an earlier case, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-24
( 1991 ), the Court rejected a due process challenge to the "common-law method for assessing
punitive damages," but indicated that unlimited jury or judicial discretion in fixing such damages
could "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." See also TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462-63 ( 1993) (rejecting a due process challenge to an award of
$10 million in punitive damages, where the jury awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages,
because TXO acted in bad faith, its conduct was part of a broader pattern of fraud and deceit, and it
was a wealthy defendant).
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say there is no evidence to support the verdict,' violates the Due Process
203
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
A few years later, in BMW of
204
North America, Inc. v. Gore,
the Court imposed another due process
restriction on punitive damages, holding that (i) lawful conduct of the
automobile manufacturer outside the state of Alabama could not be
considered by an Alabama court in determining the appropriate amount
205
of punitive damages in a fraud action,
and (ii) an award of $2 million
in punitive damages was grossly excessive in light of three facts that
serve as guideposts in determining the reasonableness of punitive
damages awards the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the disparity between the punitive damages awarded and the
actual harm to the plaintiff, and the comparison with civil and criminal
206
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.
The Gore guideposts were applied in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, a case in which the jury awarded
$1 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive
207
The judgment of the Utah court was reversed because of
damages.
the reliance on State Farm's out-of-state conduct, much of which was
lawful where it occurred, that had no nexus to the specific injury suffered
208
by the plaintiff and was not similar to that which banned the plaintiffs.
There is a presumption against an award that has such a high ratio209
145:1 in this case between punitive and compensatory damages,
and
the most relevant civil sanction under Utah law is limited to a $10,000
fine.2IO
Subsequently, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Court clarified
Campbell, holding that harm to other victims is relevant on the
reprehensibility issue, but due process precludes a state from using "a
punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts
upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent" because such use
would deprive the defendant of the opportunity to present every available
defense, and it would add a "near standardless dimension to the punitive
211
damages equation."
In determining whether a punitive damages
award is unconstitutionally excessive, appellate courts should consider a
de novo standard because a jury's award of punitive damages does not
212
constitute a finding of fact that is entitled to deference on appeal.
While the due process restrictions on punitive damages awards

203

Oberg, 512 U.S. at 415.
204
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
205
/d. at 572-73.
206
/d. at 575-85. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment by the jury awarding the plaintiff
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages.
207
State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
208
Id at419-24.
209
/d. at 426.
210
/d. at 428.
211
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).
212
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001 ).
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were imposed by the Court in the context of tort claims decided in state
courts, the principles established in those cases are argued in § 1983
213
cases as well.
Because the source of the restrictions on punitive
damages is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
restrictions are largely immune from corrective action by Congress.
However, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
power to "enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional
214
conduct.''
Because compensatory damage awards may be small in
cases establishing a violation of federal rights, application of two of the
Gore guideposts the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
215
and the comparison to civil and criminal penalties
interferes with the
goal of preventing and deterring unconstitutional conduct. Therefore,
Congress has the power based on Section 5 to legislate more broadly
216
than the Court's interpretation of Section 1.
In addition, Congress could correct the Court's decision in City of
217
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Jnc.,
which held that punitive damages are
not generally available against municipalities in a § 1983 action.

F.

Use of§ 1983 to Enforce Federal Statutory Rights
218

With the decision in Maine v. Thiboutot,
it seemed well settled
that § 1983 provided a cause of action to enforce federal statutes.
Because "Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase ['and laws'], the

213

See, e.g., Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2008) (an award of $3 million in
punitive damages, in a case in which the jury awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages,
against a prison psychiatrist who was deliberately indifferent in ignoring the medical needs of the
deceased, held to be not excessive); Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 454 (7th Cir.
2007) (suggesting that a higher ratio between punitive and compensatory damages may be tolerated
in cases where the compensatory damages awarded arc relatively low).
214
Nevada Dcp't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003)
215
BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,559 (1996).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (holding that Congress has the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to adopt "measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions" so long as there is
"a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end"). See also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28
(2003).
216
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that Congress has the power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to adopt "measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions" so long as there is
"a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end".); See also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727-28 (affirrning the congressional power to
remedy and deter violations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bd. ofTrs., Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("Congress' power 'to enforce' [§ 1 of] the Amendment includes
the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the
Amendment's text.").
217
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,271 (1981).
218
448 U.S. I, 9 ( 1980) (holding that a person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state
law may be awarded attorney fees).
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plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim
219
that petitioners violated the Social Security· Act"
The Court also
confirmed that attorney fees are available, pursuant to 42 U.S~C. § 1988,
220
in a § 1983 action seeking to enforce statutory rights.
This seemingly straightforward approach to § 1983 quickly became
clouded. In Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea
221
C/ammers Association, the Court concluded sua sponte that Congress
did not intend to allow an implied private right of action to enforce either
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act and sua sponte addressed the possibility
of enforcing these statutes through § 1983. While recognizing that such
a claim "arguably falls within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot," the
Court said it has "recognized two exceptions to the application of§ 1983
to statutory violations''. where Congress "foreclosed private
enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself," and where "the
statute at issue . . . was [not] the kind that created enforceable 'rights'
222
under § 1983."
Relying. on the first exception, the Court concluded
that, because the two statutes at issue in Middlesex County "provide quite
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms;'' Congress not only "intended
to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant
223
any remedy that otherwise would be available under§ 1983."
A few years later, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority, the Court referred to Thiboutot, Pennhurst, and
National Sea Clammers Association and said that "[u ]nder these cases, if
there is a state deprivation of a 'right' secured by a. federal statute,
§ 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor
demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the
statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private
224
225
By placing the burden on the defendant,
the Court
enforcement."
adopted an approach that is favorable to § 1983 plaintiffs.
Shortly after holding in Wilder that "reasonable and adequate''
226
provided an enforc,e able standard,
the Court in Suter v. Artist M
concluded that the "reasonable efforts" provision in the Adoption

219

/d. at 4.
220
/d. at 9-10.
22
· .1 453 U.S. I (1981 ).
222
Id. at 19 (diSC\lSSing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981 )).
223
/d. at 20-21.
224
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987) (concluding
that tenants residing in low-income housing projects ,could sue under § 1983 to enforce the Brooke
Amendment to the Housing Act, as well as HUD remtlations including utilities as part of the rent
ceiling). But see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that a private cause of action
cannot be implied directly tinder a federal regulation, but not detennining whether § 1983 can be
utilized to enforce a federal regulation).
225
This was ,confinned in Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass 'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520--21 ( 1990), which held that
the Medicaid Act created a right enforceable by health care providers to reasonable and adequate
rates of reimbursement.
226
/d. at 512.
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Assistance and Child Welfare Act was too vague and amorphous to
227
The result in Suter seems
create rights enforceable under § 1983.
inconsistent with that in Wilder. Nevertheless, in Livadas v. Bradshaw,
the Court unanimously sustained the right of a discharged employee to
sue the state labor commissioner for violating her National Labor
Relations Act right to bargain collectively, reasoning that
§ 1983 remains a generally and presumptively available
remedy for claimed violations of federal law ... [w ]e have no
difficulty concluding ... that the NLRA protects interests of
employees and employers against abridgement by a State, as
well as by private actors; that the obligations it imposes on
government actors are not so 'vague and amorphous' as to
exceed judicial competence to decide; and that Congress had
228
not meant to foreclose relief under § 1983.
The Court's most recent decisions show that it has backed away
from a plaintiff-friendly approach to the use of § 1983 to enforce federal
statutes. The plaintiffs in Blessing v. Freestone brought a § 1983 action
seeking to enforce Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, alleging that the
state agency failed to take adequate steps to obtain child support
payments for them. The Court ruled that Title IV -D did not give the
parents an enforceable right to better performance by the state agency.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court said it was necessary to examine
three factors: (i) whether the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of the
statute, (ii) whether the interests asserted are so vague and amorphous as
to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce, and (iii)
229
The
whether the statute imposes binding obligations on the state.
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, stating that the plaintiffs must
identify with particularity the right they want enforced. The Court noted
that a statutory requirement that the state operate its child support
program in "substantial compliance" with the statute is not intended to
benefit individual children and parents, but rather to establish a
230
"yardstick" to measure a state's performance.
Later, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court said "Blessing
emphasizes that it is only violations of rights, not laws, which give rise
231
Gonzaga presented the question of "whether a
to § 1983 actions."
student may sue a private university for damages under [§ 1983] to
enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ...
which prohibit the federal funding of educational institutions that have a
policy or practice of releasing education records to unauthorized

227

.

Sutcrv. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,367 (1992).
228
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994)
229
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 42 ( 1997).
230
/d. at 342-46.
231
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doc, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
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232

persons."
After examining its prior cases, the Court abandoned the
plaintiff-friendly approach that appeared in at least some of the earlier
cases. First, the Court rejected lower court decisions interpreting
Blessing as allowing individuals who fell within a general zone of
interest that a federal statute was intended to protect to enforce the statute
under § 1983. The Court confirrrted that prior cases do not "permit
anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of
233
action brought under § 1983. "
In short, "it is rights, not the broader or
vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under [§ 1983],"
and thus the Court rejected "the notion that our implied right of action
234
cases are separate and distinct from our§ 1983 cases."
While recognizing that the question of whether a federal statute can
be enforced through § 1983 is different than whether a private right of
action can be implied from a federal statute, the Court said the "inquiries
overlap in one meaningful respect in either case we must first
235
determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right."
Therefore, "the initial inquiry detertnining whether a statute confers
any right at all is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied
right of action case, the express purpose of which is to determine
whether or not a statute 'confer[s] rights on a particular class of persons
236
. • • . '"
This means, according to the Court, that "where the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to
create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether
237
under § 1983 or under an implied right of action."
It is not clear
whether the limitations imposed by the Court in Gonzaga University
238
apply only to Spending Clause legislation.
This area has become much more complicated than necessary. The
structure of § 1983 suggests that the approach should be the same
whether the plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal constitutional right or a
federal statutory right. In either case, the inquiry should be twofoldwhether the plaintiff satisfies the elements of§ 1983, and, if so, whether
the plaintiff can establish a violation of the Constitution or the statute at
issue. In Gonzaga University, the Court says "[i]n sum, if Congress
wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in

232

!d. at 276.
233
/d. at 283.
234 /d.
235
/d. at 274.
236
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 274 (2002) (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981 )).
237
/d. at 286.
238
Some language in Gonzaga suggests the Court may have relied on the fact that Spending Clause
legislation was at issue. See. e.g., id. at 280-81 C'[S]ince Pennhurst, only twice have we found
spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights," and "(o]ur more recent decisions, however,
have rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause statutes."). But see
McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2005), (holding that "[a]ny possibility that Gonzaga
is limited to statutes that rest on the spending power (as the law in Gonzaga did) has been dispelled
by Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), which treats Gonzaga as establishing the
effect of§ 1983 itself.")
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clear and unambiguous terms no less and no more than what is required
for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private
239
right of action.''
There is nothing in the language of § 1983 that
240
justifies a "clear and unambiguous terms'' requirement. If the plaintiff
meets the elements of § 1983, why not simply ask whether the
defendant's challeng,ed conduct violates the federal statute relied upon by
the plaintiff?
A related but different question is whether a statute, such as Title
241
IX of the Edu-cation Amendments, precludes a § 1983 action alleging
sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,
the Court concluded that Title IX did not preclude an equal protection
claim under § 1983 because Congress did not intend the statutory
242
remedial scheme to be the exclusive avenue of relief.
Earlier, in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court held that victims of sex
discrimination by educational institutions had an implied right of action
243
under the antidiscrimination provision of Title IX.

G.

Application of28 U.S.C. § 1728 to§ 1983 Actions

By statute, federal courts are required to give state judicial
proceedings the same preclusive effect those proceedings are given under
244
This arrangement means, for
the preclusion law of the issuing state.
example, that a defendant in a state court criminal proceeding who loses
a motion to suppress evidence alleging a violation of the Fourth
Amendment may be barred from pursuing the Fourth Amendment claim
245
in a civil action in fe-deral court.
It also means that a discharged
school official who prevailed on a breach of contract claim in state court
may be precluded from pursuing a First Amendment claim in federal
court, even though the First Amendment claim was not raised in state
246
court.
In Allen the Court concluded that there is "no reason to believe
that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an
unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decide-d in state
court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he

239

Gonzaga~ 536 U.S. at 290.

240

/d.

24

20 U .S.C. § 1681 (2006).
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009).
243
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
244
28 u.s.c. § 1738 (2006).
245
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-100 (1980). Contra Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306
(1983) (where a plaintiff brings a§ 1983 action in federal court alleging a search violated the Fourth
Amendment_, after a state court conviction based on a plea of guilty, he is not precluded under either
Virginia law or federal common law from pursuing the Fourth Amendment clairn).
246
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 465 U.S. 75, 80-85 (1984).
'
242
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247

would rather not have been engaged at all."
In short, the Court held
that § 1983 does not create an exception to § 1728.
Similarly, in University ofTennessee v. Elliott, the Court held that
Congress, in adopting § 1983, "did not intend to create an exception to
248
general rules of preclusion .... "
As a result, state preclusion law
governs the preclusive effect to be given to factual findings by a state
administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity, as long as there was a
249
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue(s).
As a result of these decisions, a § 1983 plaintiff may not only be
deprived of a federal forum for resolution of her § 1983 claims, she may
also lose her right to trial by jury administrative agencies generally do
not provide jury trials, and motions raising constitutional claims in state
criminal proceedings are usually decided by the judge, not the jury. This
is true even though the accused in a state criminal proceeding has no
choice but to raise the constitutional argument in, for example, a motion
250
to suppress evidence because-the stakes are so high.

III. OTHER DECISIONS AFFECTING § 1983 LITIGATION
As demonstrated in the prior section, the effectiveness of § l983 as
a vehicle for enforcing civil rights has been undermined over the past
thirty-five to forty years. However, the decisions interpreting§ 1983 do
not portray a full picture of the civil rights landscape, in part because
§ 1983 plaintiffs have to look elsewhere for su-b stantive rights and in part
because § 1983 cases are governed by the same procedural rules as other
civil litigation. The limited goal of this section is to demonstrate that thebarriers facing plaintiffs seeking to protect their individual and civil
rights are not limited to the Court's interpretation of§ 1983.
Given the power assumed by the Court in Marbury v. Madison as
the final voice on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, the damage it can
inflict upon civil rights litigants is most durable when the Court is
251
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
While Congress can never overturn
a Supreme Court decision, a decision interpreting a federal statute can be

247
·

Allen, 449 U.S. at 104. See also Kremer v. Chern. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 476 (1982)
(concluding "that neither the statutory language nor the congressional debates suffice to repeal
§ 1738's long-standing directive to federal courts").
248
478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986).
249
/d. at 789.
250
The same is true of the federal court plaintiff in San Remo Hotel v. County of San Francisco; 545
U.S. 323, 337--47 (2005), who was required by an earlier Supreme Court decision, Williamson
Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 4 73 U.S. 172 (1985), to pursue-an inverse condemnation action
in state court before pursuing a Fifth Amendment takings claim in federal court. State preclusion
law applied because the California courts "interpreted the relevant substantive state takings law
coextensively with· federal law." San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 335. Therefore, the federal claims
constituted the same claims already resolved in state court.
251
1 Cranch 137 ( 1803).
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rendered meaningless by simply amending the statute. Congress has
252
done this several times in the past twenty-five years.
While a decision
of the Supreme Court interpreting the U.S. Constitution could be
rendered meaningless by constitutional amendment, this rarely happens.
Congress does have the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
253
article."
But the Court interprets Section 5 and detertnines what
constitutes "appropriate legislation," and the power of Congress has been
limited substantially since 1997, beginning with the decision in City of
254
Boerne v. Flores.
Today congressional power to compensate for a
"bad" decision of the Court is substantially less than in the past. For
example, Congress compensated for the decision in Lassiter v. North
Hampton County Board of Elections (upholding a North Carolina statute
conditioning voting eligibility on a person's ability to read and write) by
255
amending the Voting Rights Act to prohibit at least some literacy tests.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court held that the amendment to the
Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that it
256
effectively overturned the result in an earlier decision.
The scope of the protection provided by the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has
declined substantially over the past thirty-five years. As Section 1 rights
contract, the range of "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 narrows.
The Supreme Court controls the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment through its interpretation of Section 1. Probably, the equal
protection decisions of the Supreme Court that are most harmful to a
progressive understanding of civil rights are those addressing invidious
race discrimination.
The Supreme Court decided that the Equal Protection Clause
257
thereby insulating practices
reaches only intentional discrimination,
and policies with a disproportionate impact, unless purposefully
discriminatory, from an equal protection challenge. As a result of the
Court's interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause does not address all
racial inequality. For example, segregated schools are consistent with the
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, unless challengers
can show that the segregation results from purposeful government
258
action.
According to the Court, formal or legal equality, not actual

252

See, e.g., Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 6 (2009); ADA Amendments

Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3557 (2008); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. I00-259, I02 Stat. 31 ( 1998); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. I 071
( 1991 ); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 ( 1978).
253
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
254
521
507 ( 1997).
255
360 u.s. 45 (1959); 42 u.s.c. § 1971 (2006).
256
384 u.s. 641 ( 1966).
257
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 ( 1976).
258
See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v . Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 ( 1976) (holding that where a
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equality, is all that the Equal Protection Clause requires.
In contrast,_ because of the Court's insistence on utilizing strict
259
scrutiny when addressing benign race-conscious actions,
most
governmental attempts to promote racial equality through benign race260
conscious actions are invalidated by the Equal Protection Clause.
A
notable exception is the decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, upholding the
University of Michigan Law School admissions policy aimed at
261
achieving student body diversity.
The Equal Protection Clause, which
was designed to promote racial equality, now stands in the way of
governmental efforts to promote such equality.
The Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause provides
another example of how the scope of the protection afforded by Section I
of the Fourteenth Amendment has narrowed. In order to prevail in a
procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must show a "protected"
liberty or property interest and, if successful, must show a defect in the
process utilized by the government. Either prong can result in the defeat
of a procedural due process claim, with the scope of "protected'' interests
262
seemingly declining.
Assuming there is a protected property or liberty
interest, the Court determines what process is due by balancing three
factors: (i) the private interest affected by the government action; (ii) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures
utilized and the probable value, if any, of additional or different
263
procedural safeguards; and (iii) the government interest.
Pre-deprivation process is most beneficial to the person who is
being deprived of a liberty or property interest by government
However, in Parratt v. Taylor, the Court held that the availability of a
post-deprivation tort remedy under state law may be sufficient to satisfy
due. pro~ess where the deprivation of a? inmate:s pr2rerty was the re~ult
2
of negligent, random and unauthorized actton.
The protection

federal court order resulted in desegregation of a school system that had been segregated by law, and
then began to resegregate due to residential shifts, it was not appropriate for the lower court to
require that attendance boundaries be redrawn annually).
259
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pcna, 515 U.S. 200 ( 1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 u.s. 469 (1989).
260
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand; 515 U.S. at 239 (remanded for application of strict
scrutiny); Croson, 488 U.S. at 511; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1978).
261
539 u.s. 306 (2003).
264
Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 ( 1970) (holding that a r<;cipicnt of public assistance
has a protected property interest in continued receipt of the assistance) with Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (finding that an individual who obtained a restraining order based on
state l~w docs not have a constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of the
restraining order).
263
Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319 (1976).
264
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U~S. 527 ( 1981 ). See also Zincnnon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 ( 1990)
(narrowing the meaning of"random and unauthorized"' to exclude governmental action where a state
delegates to high-ranking officials the power and authority to carry out the alleged deprivation and
the duty to initiate the procedural safeguards provided by state· law); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
( 1984) (extending Parrott to an intentional deprivation of property that could not be anticipated).
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afforded by procedural due process is less than it was in 1970 when the
265
and it is influenced significantly by
Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly,
state law because the Court often looks to state law to determine whether
there is a protected property or liberty interest. The availability of state
remedies, even though not comparable to § 1983 remedies, may preclude
a procedural due process claim.
While reasonable minds may differ on the scope and meaning of
procedural due process, it is viewed as a legitimate concept because of
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment: "nor shall any State deprive
266
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
In contrast, use of the Due Process Clause to protect substantive rights is
267
through 1936, the
questioned and its history checkered. From 1905
Due Process Clause was used frequently to strike down socio-economic
legislation based on freedom of contract, a right inherent in liberty as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment. This changed, beginning with the
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, when the Court abandoned
the expansive notion of liberty and began giving substantial deference to
268
legislative bodies, requiring only that they act rationally.
This
remains the standard applied to substantive due process challenges to
socio-economic legislation, with the possible exception of the punitive
269
damages cases.
270
Two cases decided during the Lochner era, Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v~ Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus &
271
Mary,
were used as the foundation for the protection of individual
rights, through substantive due process, even after Lochner was
effectively abandoned by the Supreme Court. Building on Meyer and
Pierce, substantive due process jurisprudence developed as a means of
protecting "fundamental rights," such as personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing
and education, and eventually abortion with the decision in Roe v.
272
Wade.
Because of the absence of a textual basis in the Constitution for
substantive due process, Justices who disagree with the concept sought to

397 u.s. 254 (1970).
266
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
267
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
268
300 U.S. 379 (193 7).
269
See supra Part II. E.
270
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 ( 1923) (holding, as a matter of substantive due process, that
"liberty" encompasses the right of an individual to "establish a home and bring up children").
271
Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 ( 1925) (holding
that an Oregon statute, which required parents to educate their children between the ages of eight
and sixteen in a public school, "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children").
272
Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(finding that a law making the usc of contraceptives illegal intruded on married couples' right to
privacy); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (refusing to recognize a fundamental right
to assistance in committing suicide).
265
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limit the reach of substantive due process by limiting the rights that
would be classified as fundamentaL They sought to do so by limiting
fundamental rights to those anchored in history and tradition at a very
273
specific leveL
This narrow concept of substantive due process was
rejected by five Justices in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, who stated the
"inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple
274
rule."
However, in affirming the "essential holdings" of Roe v~ Wade,
the Court abandoned the "fundamental right" and "strict scrutiny"
language of Roe v. Wade and spoke of a liberty interest that could not be
275
unduly burdened by government.
Today, what is protected by substantive due process is likely to be
referred to as a protected liberty interest, rather than a fundamental right,
276
with the level of scrutiny ranging from heightened rational basis
to a
277
balancing approach.
Even after Casey, the Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg upheld a Washington statutory ban on physician-assisted
suicide against a facial substantive due process challenge and noted that
the "established method of substantive-due-process analysis has
primary features'' it specially protects fundamental rights and liberties
deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, and there must be a
278
careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
Despite the "primary features" described in Glucksberg, the Court
has used a variety of approaches to substantive due process claims. For
279
example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
the Court recognized that
substantive due process may be utilized in a § 1983 action for damages
alleging an abuse of executive power~ However, in order to avoid
substantial overlap between such a claim and state tort law, the Court
held that only an abuse of power that ''shocks the conscience" will be
280
actionable .
The Court rejected "deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights" as the standard in Lewis because the case involved
a high-speed chase by police officers, resulting in the death of a
passenger on the fleeing motorcycle, and the Court was concerned that in

273

See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. II 0, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Justice

Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
274
Planned Parenthood of Sc. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 849 (1982)
275
!d. at 877.
276
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding the-Texas statutory ban on same-sex
sodomy violates the Due Process Clause).
277
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right of a
competent person to refuse unwanted medical treatment, while upholding Missouri's clear and
convincing evidence standard for determining the wishes of the individual).
278
521 u.s. 702, 703 (1997)
279
523
833 (1998).
280
ld. at 846.
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281
deliberation. -

such a situation there is no opportunity for actual
In another case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, the Court held that government's "failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation
282
of the Due Process Clause."
Because government had not created the
danger to the child, or rendered the child more vulnerable to abuse by his
father, the Court refused to find liability absent a "custodial relationship"
283
or a government-created danger.
Substantive due process claims arise
in a wide variety of circumstances. For our purposes, it is sufficient to
say that the current Court does not favor such claims, and that it is
certainly not willing to- expand the protection provided by substantive
284
due process.
While the Court was interpreting § 1983 narrowly and imposing a
number of substantial barriers to plaintiffs seeking relief under that
statute, it was also interpreting other civil rights provisions narrowly. On
several occasions, Congress has reacted to a Supreme Court decision
interpreting a civil rights statute narrowly by amending the statute- to
285
For example, the
specifically overturn the result reached by the Court.
286
Pregnancy Discrimination Act
was passed in 1978, shortly after the
287
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
which held that
discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination within the
288
meaning of Title VII. In . Grove City College v. Bell,
the Court
289
which bans sex discrimination by
narrowly interpreted Title IX,
educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance, to cover
discrimination only in the program that actually receives the financial
assistance, rather than the entire educational institution. This narrow
interpretation was specifically rejected in 1988, when Congress passed
290
the Civil Rights Restoration Act
for the purpose of correcting the
Grove City decision.
291
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991
to address several
292
decisions narrowly interpreting_ § 1981
and Title VII of the Civil

281

/d. at 851 .
282
489 U.S~ 189, 197 (1989) (finding no due process violation whc.n county welfare workers failed
to protect a young child from his abusive father even though the welfare department had intervened
on numerous occasions and the caseworkers were fully aware of the danger).
281
/d. at 189-90.
284
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process; 60 FLA. L. REv. 519, 523-25 (2008).
285
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
286
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k) (2006).
287
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
288
Grove City Coli. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
289
20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
290
· Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988)).
291
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
292
42 u.s.c. § 1981 (2006).
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293

Rights Act of 1964.
One of those decisions was Patterson v. McClean
294
Credit Union, interpreting § 1981, which prohibits race discrimination
295
in contracting, to exclude ''postforrnation conduct,''
thereby rejecting
racial harassment, failure to promote, and discharge claims brought by an
African-American woman. The 1991 Act specifically defined the term
"make and enforce contracts" to include ''the making, performance)
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
296
relationship."
This Act also overturned portions of the decision in
297
Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, narrowing the scope of disparate
298
impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
299
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective in
January 2009, overturned the results in several Supreme Court decisions
300
Most
narrowly interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act.
301
recently, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
was passed to
302
correct the result in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc..
The Act provides that the time limit for filing pay discrimination claims
under Title VII begins to run each time an employee receives a paycheck
that manifests discriminatiotl, rather than w-h en the employer makes a
discriminatory pay decision. In each of these corrective Acts, Congress
explicitly noted its disagreement with the Court's statutory
303
interpretation.
For purposes of this article an attempt to analyze and provide
potential responses to all Supreme Court decisions adversely affecting
civil rights litigation is urmecessary. One possible solution to this
problem. would be to amend federal statutes that provide substantive
rights. This could alter the Court's narrow interpretation of those
statutes. However, the feasibility of such amendments depends on the
political climate. A more drastic solution would be to amend the
304
Constitution, but the amendment process provided in Article V
of the
Constitution was designed to set a high bar, and the current political
climate is not conducive to expanding civil rights through constitutional
amendments~
Another way to fix the Court's previous narrow

293

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000e-l7 (2006).
294
Pattcrsonv. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 164 (1989).
295
Pallerson, 491 U.S. at 165.
296
42 u.s.c. § 198l(b).
297
Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 ( 1989).
298
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-e-17 (2006).
299
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3557 (2008).
300
See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albcrtsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Scrv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
301
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3) (2006).
302
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; 12 7 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
303
E.g., H.R. 2764, ll Oth Cong. (2008), Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3557 (2008).
304
U.S. CONS!. art. V.
.
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interpretations is through the Court itself. This, however, is also unlikely
due to the current make-up of the Court and the vacancies that seem
likely in the near future. A third option is to substitute statutory rights
for the narrowly interpreted provisions of the Constitution, as attempted
305
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which followed the
Court's strict interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Department of
306
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.
This option failed because the
Court narrowly interpreted Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
legislative power utilized by Congress in passing the Religious Freedom
307
Restoration Act.
Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where Congress has the
power to substitute a statutory right for a narrowly-interpreted
constitutional provision through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
309
308
the Commerce Clause
or the Spending Clause;
combined with the
310
That, however, is for another article.
Necessary and Proper Clause.
The limited scope of Part IV is to suggest an amendment to § 1983 that
would address some of the problems identified in Part II, above.

IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO§ 1983
In Part II, I identified seven major areas individual immunity,
governmental entity immunity, supervisory liability·, color of law,
limitations on punitive damages, enforcement of statutory rights, and
preclusion in which the Court's interpretation of § 1983 has
significantly narrowed a plaintiffs chances of recovery. Most of these
limiting decisions, I contend, are not supported by either the language of
311
§ 1983 or public policy considerations.
Therefore, it is time for

305

306

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (2006).,

Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
307
See City of Boerne v. Flowers, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
308
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
309
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. L
310
·
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL t 8. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. l, 34 42 (2005), argues in favor ofutilizing the Necessary and Proper Clause to supplement the
Commerce Clause where,. for example, "regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a
comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity docs not itself
'substantially affect' interstate commerce,.,' or regulation of "noneconomic local activity" is "a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce." /d. at 37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966), the Court compared Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Necessary and Proper Clause, stating "[b]y including Section 5 the
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in ~he Necessary and Proper Clause." Later, in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justice Douglas wrote that ~'[c]ongressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is . . . buttressed by congressional power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause." /d. at 149 n.l3 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
311
Of course, the Court is not supposed to rewrite a statute simply because Congress has not acted in
accordance with the Court's view of what is good public policy.
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Congress to repair at least some of the damage the Court has inflicted on
§ 1983 and those who are entitled to rely upon it for relief from
violations of their civil rights. Following is a proposed amended version
of the statute:
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
(a)
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any· rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injure.d in an action at law,
suit in equity,. or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
(b)
For the purpose of this section:
(1)
Any act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
(2)
"[U]nder color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or
territozy or the District of Columbia" includes the
conduct of private individuals and entities that is
(a) taken pursuant to an agreement with state or
local government; (b) authorized by state or local
government, (c) taken on behalf of, or at least in
part for the benefit of, state or local government,
(d) taken jointly with state or local government
employees, agents or officials, (e) taken with the
assistance of state or local government, or (f) taken
in the performance of a public function that is
traditionally an important function of state or local
.
t
312
governmen. ·
(3)
When a person alleges a deprivation of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by [section 1 of
312
··

This subsection adopts an expansive view of "under color of law," consistent with Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass 'n; 531 U.S. 288 (2001 ), Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). While this does not
change the· Court's decisions interpreting "state action" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, it
expands the reach of§ 1983 for plaintiffs seeking to enforce (a) provisions ofthe Constitution that
do not require state action, like the Thirteenth Amendment, apd (b) federal statutes that provide
substantive rights against private parties.
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the Fourteenth Amendment to] the Constitution,''
conduct of private individuals and entities
constitutes "state action" when it satisfies
subsection (b)(2) and when its prohibition is
necessary to remedy and deter violation of rights
313
guaranteed by section 1.
The term ''person," insofar as it describes those
who "shall be liable to the party injured," includes
individuals,
states
and
state
agencies,
municipalities and local governmental agencies,
and private entities that fall within subsection
(b )(2). 314
Entities, both governmental and private, are subject
to respondeat superior liability, i.e., they are
subject to liability for deprivations of protected
rights caused by their agents and employees while
acting within the scope of their agency or
315
employment.
A supervisor "subjects, or causes to be subjected"
another person "to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" where the supervisor was
personally involved in the deprivation and where
the supervisor either knew or should have known
of the deprivation, but took no preventive or
3 16
corrective action.

While Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the power to enlarge
substantially the substance of§ 1 as defined by the Court, "Congress' power 'to enforce' [Section I]
of the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed
thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment 's text. " Bd. of Trs. , Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S . 356, 365
(200 I). This subsection prohibits "a somewhat broader swath of conduct" than Section 1 because it
expands a bit the concept of "state action," when necessary ''to remedy and to deter violation of
rights guaranteed [by Section 1]." A challenge to conduct that falls within this "broader swath of
conduct" is based on subsection (b)(3), not Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
Congress may not enlarge § Section rights beyond the Court' s interpretation. This means that
subsection (b)(3) provides a substantive right, not just a cause of action to enforce rights found
elsewhere, i.e., there is a statutoa right to challenge some private conduct that does not constitute
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600,617 (1979) ("Unlike the 1866 and 1870 Acts, [Section] l of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
did not provide for any substantive rights equal or othetwise. As introduced and enacted, it served
only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for violations of the Constitution ... .").
314
This subsection confiuns the holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
( 1978), that a municipality is a "person," but overrules the holding in Will v. Michigan Department
ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), that neither a state nor a state agency is a "person" subject to suit
under § 1983.
315
This subsection invalidates the holding in Monell v. Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658
( 1978), that a municipality cannot be held liable based on respondeat superior.
31 6
This subsection invalidates the holding in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), that
supervisory liability is a misnomer because a supervisor "is only liable for his or her own
misconduct." ld at 1949.
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(c)

The qualified immunity defense, recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in several cases, is abolished and any
"person," as defined above in subsection (b)(4), found to
have violated the federal constitutional or statutory rights of
another person in an action based on this section is liable
for equitable relief and damages, including punitive
317
damages.
(d)
The absolute immunity defense, recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in several cases, is abolished and any
"person," as defined above in subsection (b)(4), found to
have violated the federal constitutional or statutory rights of
another person in an action based on this section is liable
for equitable relief and damages, including punitive
damages, except state and municipal judges are immune
from an award of damages against them in their individual
capacity, based on action taken in their judicial capacity,
that (i) is subject to review by a state appellate court, (ii) is
entitled to preclusive effect under state preclusion law, (iii)
provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate, as required
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
318
and (iv) is the result of an adversarial proceeding.
(e)
Any "person," as defined above in subsection (b)(3), is
subject to suit, brought pursuant to this section, in federal
court and any protection provided by the Eleventh
319
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is abrogated.
(f) Where the plaintiff satisfies the elements of this section, it
creates a private right of action to enforce federal statutory
rights without any showing that Congress, in clear and
unambiguous tem1s, expressed its intent to create new

317

This subsection eliminates both qualified immunity as a defense to claims for damages against
governmental officials, agents and employees in their individual capacity, and governmental
immunity from punitive damages. While respondeat superior liability, provided in subsection
(b)(5), reduces the evils of qualified immunity, it needs to be eliminated because it is confusing and
substantially increases the costs, including the unnecessary use of judicia] resources, of litigation.
318
This subsection eliminates absolute immunity as a defense to claims for damages against
governmental officials, agents and employees in their individual capacity when pcrfonning certain
functions, such as legislative, judicial and prosecutorial functions. However, it retains a more
limited fonn of immunity for state and municipal court judges, acting in their judicial capacity under
certain conditions. The conditions would lead to a di tferent result in some cases decided by the
Supreme Court, including Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S . 9 (1991) (holding judge judicially immune
from lawsuit regarding his order requesting and authorizing court officers to usc excessive force
against an attorney in bringing him into court), and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
(holding judge immune from lawsuit regarding his order approving a " tubal ligation" procedure on a
fifteen-year-old female based on an ex parte petition). Non-judicial officials pcrfonning a judicial
function, as in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), would no longer enjoy absolute immunity.
319
This subsection abrogates the Eleventh Amendment protection, provided to states and state
agencies, from an award of damages in an action in federal court. Congress has the power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "through a valid exercise of its [Section 5]
power..." when it makes " its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."
Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,727, 721 (2003).

74

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS

[Vol. 16:1

rights enforceable under this section, unless the statute the
plaintiff seeks to enforce contains its own comprehensive
enforcement mechanism that is inconsistent with a private
320
right of action under this section.
(g)
Where necessary to prevent or deter unconstitutional
conduct, an award of punitive damages is not limited by the
amount of compensatory damages awarded or available
321
civil and criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.
(h)
The statutory full faith and credit provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 does not apply to actions under this section where
(i) the prior state "judicial proceedings" were in the context
of a criminal prosecution, (ii) the federal claim was not
actually litigated and decided in the prior state "judicial
proceedings," or (iii) the prior state "judicial proceedings"
were required to make the federal claim(s) ripe;
administrative proceedings shall not be given preclusive
322
effect in actions under this section.
(i) The legal sufficiency of a complaint alleging a violation of
§ 1983, when one or more defendants seeks dismissal for
failure to state a claim, will be determined under the
standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957), accepting all allegations in the complaint as true,
dismissal is proper only if there is no set of facts on which
the plaintiff(s) would be entitled to relief against the
323
defendant(s).
These proposed amendments demonstrate a true commitment to
protection of civil rights, unlike the Court's derogation of civil rights. A
primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983, was to
protect civil rights by imposing restrictions on the states.
Counterintuitively, while states are generally subject to tort claims based
on state laws, the Court has made it more difficult for civil rights
plaintiffs than tort plaintiffs to succeed in obtaining remedies. The point
is simply this a person hit and injured by a government-owned vehicle
is more likely to obtain full relief than a victim of excessive force by a
police officer. As a result, there is little incentive for state and local
government to make compliance with civil rights regulations a priority.

320

This subsection invalidates the results in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002),
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), and Suter v. Artist M , 503 U.S. 347 (1992), all of which
place restrictions on the use of§ 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights.
321
This subsection eliminates two of the "guideposts" established by the Court in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-84 ( 1996).
322
This subsection ovenules the results in A /len v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 ( 1980), Migra v. Warren
City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75 ( 1984), San Remo Hotel v. County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) and Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 ( 1986), insofar as they held
that § 1983 claims or issues were precluded.
323
This subsection requires application of the standard adopted in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957), rather than the standard adopted in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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Why should defendants who violate civil rights be held liable- in
damages only if the right at issue was ''clearly established'' at the time of
the challenged conduct? This is not the standard applied in tort law.,
Why should governmental entities be absolved of liability for the
unconstitutional actions of their agents, absent a showing that their
agents were acting pursuant to entity policy? This is not the standard
applied to entities in tort law, where respondeat superior is the norm.
Why should supervisors who know, or would know if they cared, of the
misconduct of their subordinates not be held responsible for suc-h
misconduct? This is a form of negligent supervision that is generally
recognized as actionable in tort law. Why should states and state
agencies be protected from civil rights liability by the misinterpretation
324
of the Eleventh Amendment in Hans
and the resulting narrow
325
interpretation of "person" in Wi//?
I fully understand the difficulty of passing legislation that enhances
protection for civil rights. Most states and their political subdivisions are
already experiencing budget difficulties and the proposed legislation will
be viewed as exposing those units of government to greater liability and
costs. However, whether or not such legislative reform would result in
greater costs to state and local government depends on how those units of
government react. The goal is to deter violations of civil rights, not to
increase costs. One- way to reduce civil rights litigation and reduce the
cost of such litigation is to make more serious efforts to prevent
violations of civil rights. Ideally such legislation would result in fewer
violations, not more and larger judgments. Taxpayers who are upset
with judgments that have to be paid by state and local government should
elect officials who make avoiding such liability a priority. Do not blame
the victims who seek compensation for their injuries; rather~ blame the·
government officials who engage in or tolerate the violations of civil
rights.,
Most taxpayers who complain about the cost of civil rights liability
view the matter very differently when, for example, a family member is
the victim of the use of excessive force by a police officer or a family
member is fired from a government job because she failed to support the
winning candidate for political office.. While government units will not
be able to prevent all civil rights violations, just as they cannot prevent
all negligent conduct by agents and employees, they can contain costs by
326
making prevention a priority.

324

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, I 0-11 (1890) (holding that states are protected from suits by their
own citizens by the Eleventh Amendment).
325
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State-P<>licc, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor a state
agency is a "person" subject to suit under§ 1983).
326
Exposure to liability for violations :o f civil rights, like exposure to tort liability, can be addressed
through insurance. Governmental units with more accidents and more violations of civil rights will
pay more for insurance, but that too can be addressed through preventive measures.

76

TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS
.

V.

CONCLUSION

.

[Vol. 16:1

In many respects, the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1983 is
inconsistent with the statutory language, the purpose of the statute, and
the importance of civil rights.
Therefore, Congress should take
corrective action, as it has done on several occasions in the past when the
Court has misinterpreted civil rights statutes in favor of defendants.

